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The efFect olcspatial difFerentiation d la Hotelling on the equilibrium position ol the 
telecommunications indusfly is investigated. When networks are difFerentiated and 
use linear pricing they can charge prices about the Ramsey social optimal. Under 
both unilorm pricing and termination-based price discrimination interconnection fees 
can be used to support collusion. When net~\'Orks are located in the same location in 
a Hotellillg model they are perlect substitutes. Prices jedl to the Ramsey optimal as 
they can undercut each other \\'ithout concem Ol'er a/1 access deficit. When a 
~patia/~1' difFerentiated net~\'()rk enters the industry collusion, through the incumbents' 
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Telecommunication pnces m South Africa are notoriously high, despite the 
presence of five network providers and a regulator, the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA). Four of the five 
networks use tem1ination-based price differentiation. Virgin Mobile, who 
entered the market in 2006, charges consumers the same price for calls 
tenninating on and off their network. While the high fixed-line prices may be 
attributed to the network, Telkom, having monopoly power, the high mobile 
prices are harder to explain. The four mobile providers appear to offer 
consumers the same service, but consumers are not benefiting as much as hoped 
from price competition. 
In this work I examme the effect of network differentiation on the 
telecommunication industry equilibrium. The predominant model of the 
telecommunication industry involves firms which are located at each end of a 
continuum of consumers, it la Hotelling's spatial differentiation model. The 
networks are not perfect substitutes and can use high interconnection fees and 
linear tariffs to sustain high prices. I examine whether both uniform pricing 











I then briefly consider the impact on social welfare and industry equilibrium of 
entry by a differentiated network. New entrants are usually welcomed as 
customers expect price decreases through increased competition. If the entrant 
offers a differentiated service consumers also expect to benefit from purchasing 
a service closer to their taste. Entrants may however use differentiation to aid 
collusion, and solve a Bertrand paradox. I discuss the entry of a differentiated 
finn into an undifferentiated oligopoly and the impact on social welfare under 
pricing policies. 
I have based my research on prior work by Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998, 
2000) and Armstrong (1998, 2002). Their models both included spatial 
differentiation as developed by Hotelling. This dissertation is theoretical, 
although there is some application to the South African market. I employ game 
theoretic models common to industrial organisation. 
The paper is divided into eight sections. In the first section, I will review the 
seminal literature on the economics of telecommunications. The review 
includes a detailed explanation of Laffont, Rey and Tirole's model on which 
mine is based. In the second section my model will be introduced, and 
explained. In the next two sections I will calculate the oligopoly equilibrium 
when there is no network differentiation. In the fifth and sixth sections I 











differentiated network. In the seventh section I apply insights from the model 
to the current market structure in South Africa. I then conclude. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This dissertation is an extension of the work by Laffont et al on industrial 
organization of the telecommunications sector. There are many subdivisions 
within telecommunication economics. Laffont and Tirole (2000) divide up 
their book Competition in Telecommunicatiol1s accordingly. Chapters 3 and 4 
focus on one way access, but this work is concerned with the work in Chapter 5 
(co-authored by Rey) on two-way access. Two-way access occurs when there 
exist at least two networks and customers from each network want to connect 
with customers on other networks. More detailed work on two-way access is 
found in two papers from The RAND Journal of Economics that the three co-
authored in 1998: "Network Competition: 1. Overview and Nondiscriminatory 
Pricing" and. "Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination". The model 
included in these papers is the basis of my work, and hence shall be discussed 
in depth. Armstrong (1998) independently reached the same results as Laffont 
et al and the review includes his supplementing insights. 
Laffont et al (2000) use a discrete-choice model to illustrate how 











methods of lessening collusion: build-up of market share, nonlinear pricing, 
tennination-based price discrimination, and reception subsidies. This paper 
focuses on the impact of uniform prices versus tennination based price 
discrimination within different oligopoly stmctures, thus it is the focus of this 
literature review. 
To coherently present the arguments and conclusions the literature reVIew IS 
divided up into six sections: interconnection fees and the cost stmcture; the 
demand structure and spatial differentiation; unifonn pncll1g and collusion; 
tennination-based price discrimination and collusion; interconnection fees and 
entry; and the location of my work in relation to the literature.' 
a. Interconnection Fees and the Cost Stmcture 
Networks charge each other an interconnection (termination) fee every time a 
call is tenninated on their network. When a customer of Network1 calls a 
customer of Network2, Network1 pays a fee to Network2 to terminate the call. 
In some countries, including the United States, Canada, China and Mexico, the 
mobile receiver pays the tennination fee when they are called (Lessem, 2005; 
p3). While this may make some economic sense it impinges on individuals' 
3 While the review may appear lengthy and morc dctailed than normal, an in-dcpth 
understanding of the model presentcd is essential. By including the analytical details of 
Laffont. Rey and Tirole's model in the literature review the reader will not mistakenly credit me 











freedom to choose their consumption level. Laffont et af assume that the 
originating caller pays the full fee for the call, as will 1. Each network can 
charge equal interconnection fees, or each network can set its own fee. In the 
absence of regulatory interference interconnection fees can be set equal to 
marginal cost, above it or below it. If the interconnection fee is not equal to 
marginal cost of interconnection then networks are faced with different 
marginal costs for calls originating and terminating on their network (on-net 
calls) and calls originating on their network but tenninating on another network 
(off-net calls). If networks price discriminate according to whether a call 
terminates on or off their network, they are practicing termination based price 
discrimination. When networks charge the same price for on -net and off-net 
calls they are using a uniform pricing policy. 
Laffont et af (1998a; p6) formulate the marginal cost to a network of a call unit 
as 
(2.1 ). 
Where C() is the marginal cost of originating and tenninating the call, and c / is 
the intennediate cost. The nature of the intermediate marginal cost, c /, differs 
with the type of call. For local loop calls it could be interpreted as the 
switching cost. With long distance calls it may be the marginal cost of trunk 











cost to their network. There is also a fixed cost,j; to the provider of connecting 
a customer to the network. 




Market Share u\ 
Cost c + (/ - Co 
Price PI 





Market Share U2 
Network \ is charged an interconnection fee, (/, whenever its customers phone 
someone on network2. Laffont et al assume that there is reciprocal access 
pricing, which means that all networks charge an equal fee to terminate a call. 
The marginal cost for the originating network of an off-net call is therefore: 
This can also be formulated as 
c + a - co. 











If Uj is the market share of network j then the average (or perceived) marginal 
cost of a call for network j is: 
c + (I - ai )( a - co) 
I f the interconnection fee is set to cost, perhaps due to industry regulation, then 
the perceived marginal costs of on-and off- net calls are both equal to c. 
The marginal cost of originating an off-net call and the marginal cost or 
revenue of tenninating an off-net call sum to the marginal cost of an on-net call, 
since the interconnection fee and revenue cancel out. Even if networks do 
cancel out interconnection fees they may be left with a surplus / deficit at the 
end of the month if traffic is not balanced. Laffont er al (1998a; p3) assume 
that there is a balanced calling pattern, implying that the percentage of calls 
which originate and terminate on a particular network is equal its market share. 
The access surplus/deficit is thus given by: 
Ai =api(q(pJ-q(Pi))(a-cO ) 
The access surplus/deficit is minimized when the market is cornered by a 
monopoly and no off-net calls are made. In an oligopoly it is minimized by 
equal market shares. If Pi = Pi the interconnection fees paid and revenue 
received will cancel out for each network. This must be distinguished from the 











referred to as the 'bill and keep' system. Here there is no access surplus or 
deficit, but the interconnection fee does not affect the perceived marginal cost 
either (Lessem, 2005; p 13). Networks may choose to pass the interconnection 
fee to the consumer, and this becomes interesting when the interconnection fee 
is different to the marginal cost of terminating the call. 
b. The Demand Structure and Spatial Differentiation 
Laffont et (1/ (1998a; p6) then formulate the demand structure of the industry, 
which they base on Hotelling's model of spatial positioning of finns. They 
assume that consumers are unifonnly distributed along x = [0, 1] with one 
network located at each extremity; network1at 0 and network2 at 1. I have not 
found a theoretical explanation in their work for using Hotelling's model. 
While it may be an attempt to introduce product differentiation into the model 
this is not explicitly stated. In reality joining a telecommunications network 
does not mean driving to the other side of town and an analogy between travel 
and product difference needs to be justified. I attempt to rationalise the use of 












Figure 2: Basic Spatial Network Distribution 
Network l Networkc 
Consumers 
'(=0 x=1 
Continuing with the demand stmcture, the utility of a consumer with income y 
and telephone consumption q is given by: 
There is a fixed connection surplus of v(), which can be set sufficiently high 
causing the entire population to be connected to a network, even if they make 
no calls (1998a; p7). Practically it could be the utility from knowing that 
emergency phone calls could be made, or from receiving calls. The cost of 
being connected to a network which is at a different 'address'" to the consumers 
is given by t{r-xJ where i = [1, 2j. This is the disutility of not receiving the 
preferred service. The variable gross surplus, II (q), is defined by: 




This results in a constant elasticity demand function since: 
ll'(p) = P ~ q = p-'1 
4 This is the term used by Laffont et at (1998a; p6). Since address is contained in inverted 
commas it suggests that it is not a physical address to which they refer, but that there is some 











As Annstrong (1998; p550) notes explicitly in the model consumers gain utility 
only from making calls, they are indifferent to receiving calls. 
Laffont et al assume for technical convenience that the elasticity of demand, 11, 
is greater than one, although they note that empirical studies do not support this 
assumption (l998a; p7). Griffin (1982; p66) found the long nm price elasticity 
of long distance services to be -0.6, and only -0.1 for local calls. He used a 
pooled cross-sectional study of quarterly data from five south-westem states in 
the USA over the period 1964 to 1978 (p59). This is obviously for fixed line 
telecommunications. Laffont et al (l998a; p7) cite Taylor (1994) who also 
found a price elasticity of less than one. In the last thirteen years the price 
elasticity of short and long distance calls may have increased with the 
increasing popularity of substitutes such as text messaging and email. 
Laffont et (// (2000; p192) define the consumer's variable net surplus under 
unifonn pricing as 
-('I-I) 
v(p) = max{lI(q) - pq} = ,,-p_-
'I '7-1 
By Shepard's lemma 
v'(p) = -q(p) 
A consumer located at x=o. is indifferent between the two networks when 
















is an index of substitutability between the two networks (1998a; p7). If f "'" 00 
or P'=Pi then the market share is split evenly. 
Total consumer welt~1re under is the sum of the consumers' variable net surplus 
and their disutility from not consuming their optimal service (1998b; p42). The 
disutility of the average consumer is equal to 
For the pnce vector P = {PI' P2} the total consumer welfare under linear 
uniform pricing is equal to 
W(P) = a(P)v(PI) + (1- a(P))v(P2) - T(a(P)) 
If the industry is symmetrical in prices and market share then the welfare 
. .. 
maxImIzmg pnce IS 
If the joint and common cost to establishing a network are ignored, then the 











the mlnllllUm pnce at which the networks break even on each consumer 
(Laffont et aI, 2000; p 193). This is the Ramsey price, calculated by 
(pR _ C)q(pR) = f 
In a symmetric market with Ramsey prices the average consumer welfare is 
W(P) = v(pR)-tI4 
In contrast the monopoly price which maximizes industry profits is given by the 
inverse elasticity rules as 
pH _ c I 
pI! TJ 
For unifof111 pricing oligopolies the Ramsey and the monopoly prices are the 
lower and upper bounds of sustainable rational call prices. When networks use 
two-part taritTs the welfare maximizing price is equal to the marginal cost, 
however under linear tariffs pricing equal to marginal cost would result in a loss 
as the fixed cost,}; would not be paid by consumers (Armstrong, 2002; p360). 
c. Unifonn Pricing and Collusion 
The profit of network j is 
This can be separated into retail profit from consumers and access revenue 
(deficit) from (to) networkj , given by 
Tr; = a;[(p; - c)q(p;) - f) + apj(a - Co )[q(p j) - q(p;)] 
~--~----~ ~------~------~ 











If the interconnection fee exceeds the marginal cost of termination, (a>co), then 
network1 will only make an access surplus if it terminates more calls than it 
originates and given a balanced calling pattern this requires q(Pi) > q(Pi). This 
will occur only if network1 charges a higher price than network!, i.e. Pi> Pi' 
Interconnection fees can aid collusion as an increase in the access charge 
increases the perceived marginal cost of the call. The average cost of a call 
depends on the market share of the service provider. For the duopolists to share 
the market evenly they must charge the same price. The first order condition 
for a symmetric solution is: 
p*-(c+ a-~) 
___ --==2_ = ~[l- 20"Jr(p*)] 
p* TJ 
This equation is a variation of Lerner's inverse elasticity rule, and on the left 
hand side of this equation is the Lerner index (Laffont et ai, 2000; p 193). Since 
the market shares are even half of the calls made are made to consumers off the 
network. This increases the perceived marginal cost to 
a-c c+-_o 
2 
By increasing the interconnection fee the perceived marginal cost increases, as 











Armstrong (2002) approaches the question slightly differently. He analyses a 
two-stage game where networks first jointly choose an interconnection fee and 
then non-cooperatively set the price. Using notation I1(p) = (p - c)q(p) and 
given interconnection fee a, the first order profit maximizing requirement is 
that (p363): 
- q(p) . 1 1 
2t (I1(p) -.f) +2 I1'(P) -4(a - c" )q'(p) = O. 
Joint profits are maximized by price p * where 
I1'(p*) = d[(p-c)q(p)] =q(p)+(p-c)(-lJP-17-1)=0. 
dp* 
Knowing this the interconnection fee which will sustain collusion if it IS 
sustainable is 
q(p*) 2 . 
a* = c + (Jr(p*) - f) > c . 
() '( *) . 0 -q P t 
If the interconnection fee is set to a* then networks do not have an incentive to 
undercut each other as the gain in retail profits is exactly offset by the increased 
interconnection fee payment (Armstrong, 2002; p364). The optimal 
interconnection fee, a *, is high when demand is inelastic, the maximum profit 
per subscriber and the substitutability of the networks is high (p363). When t is 











Importantly collusion only works if the two services are not close substitutes. 
If they are close substitutes then, by deviating and charging p,<p *, network j can 
capture the whole market, provided that5 
V(Pi) ;::: v(P*) + t . 
I f PI is sufficiently close to p*, so that 
!r(Pi) - f > ~[!r(P*) - f], 
then the collusive price cannot be sustained. The attempted collusion devolves 
Bertrand style (Armstrong, 2002; p364). 
With two-part tariffs the network's optimum call tariff is its perceived marginal 
cost, not the industry cost (Laffont et al, 1998a; p21). There is more 
competition as networks can compete for market share by lowering the fixed 
fee while keeping prices equal to the perceived marginal cost (Annstrong, 
2002; p366). There is more competition than with two-part tariffs, but unless 
the interconnection fee is set equal to cost social welfare is not maximized. 
d. Tennination-Based Price Discrimination and Collusion 
Under tennination based price discrimination networks charge a different price 
for off- and on-net calls. This reflects the different marginal costs of the calls. 
5 I think that if v(p,) = v(p*) + t consumers would be indifferent, and the two networks would 











I have used Pi to denote the price of on-net calls and Pi for off-net calls. 




Market Share U1 
(Laffont et aI, 1998b: p42). 







Market Share U2 
Termination pnce discrimination introduces network externalities to the 
consumers. If off- and on-net calls cost the same then consumers are indifferent 
to which network they call (Laffont et ai, 2000; p201). However if they pay 
less for on-net calls than for off-net calls then they will want to join the network 
that their friends and family are on. These network externalities, known as 











Let network j have price Pi h on-net calls and Pi for off-net calls (2000; p203). 
The consumer's net variable surplus is now given by 
This is the sum of the net variable surplus gained from phoning consumers on 
their network, a
l 
V(pi ), and from phoning consumers on the rival network(s), 
(1 - a
l 
)v( PI)' Thus the market share of network j in a duopoly is now 
1 
a = - + 0-( W - (J) ). 
I 2 I I 
However there is circularity as market shares depend on consumer surplus, 
which in tum depends on market shares. This can be circumvented using 
expectations of the consumers (2000; p204). If all consumers expected all other 
consumers to join networkj , then network j would receive a market share equal 
to 
The real market shares are given by 
6 This notation is different to that used in Laffont et al (1998a. 1998b and 2000), but it is for 











The profit of network l with price discrimination is 
This can also be separated into retail profit from consumers and access revenue 
( defici t) from (to) network
J 
v v 
Reflli/Pro/i! Ter min (ll/ull Rc \'('11111..' Deticil 
A proportionality mle holds for prices, meaning that the ratio of the off-net to 
the on-net call price is equal to the ratio of the off-net to the on-net marginal 
call cost, i.e. 
Pi c+a-co =------
In order to maximize profit the Lerner indices of the services are proportional to 
the inverse elasticities of demand. The elasticity of demand for off-net calls is 
equal to that for on-net calls, and the Lerner indices are also be identical, i.e. 
p *-c + a -co 
p* 




If the access charge is above cost then price discrimination raises the price of 
off-net calls and lowers the price for on-net calls. The average price is lower 











cheaper on-net calls and decrease the amount of more expensive off-net calls 
which they make (2000; p204). Lower prices will cause consumer welfare to 
Increase. 
Networks can build market share if they reduce their on-net price (2000, p202). 
Since the interconnection fee deficit relies on the volume of off-net calls of the 
networks, reducing the on-net price will not increase their interconnection fee 
deficit. Thus price discrimination increases competitiveness. 
The total efIect of price discrimination on consumer welfare is uncertain. Total 
consumer welfare is the sum of the consumers' variable net surplus and their 
disutility from not consuming their optimal service (1998b; p42). For the price 
vector P = (f.\PI' Pc' P2) consumer welfare is equal to 
W(P) = a(P)w(p1.PI) + (1- a(P»w(P2' P2 ) - T(a(P» 
The Ramsey optimum is given by 
which is identical to the Ramsey price under uniform pricing. If the market is 
regulated then uniform Ramsey prices are optimal for consumers. Along with 












e. Interconnection Fees and Entry 
When a service provider enters the market they can either build their own 
network (facilities based entry), lease services from the incumbent (resale 
entry), or lease some services and build the remainder (unbundling). I am most 
concerned with facilities based entry, where the only fee which the entrant will 
pay the incumbent(s) is the interconnection fee. This interconnection fee can be 
mandated by a regulator or completely unconstrained (1998a; p 15). 
Laffont et a/ (1998a & 1998b) used their model to explore entry scenarios. 
They examined entry into a monopoly market, under both discriminatory and 
non-discriminatory pricing. With entry under both pricing policies the entrant 
incurs a fixed cost, l for each customer they connect (1998a; p 15). Under 
facilities-based entry the entrant chooses their coverage j.1 E [0,1] and incurs a 
cost of d{p) which is increasing and convex (1998a; p 16). It is assumed that the 
incumbent has full coverage. 
The market shares are dependent on the size of /1, as the extent of the entrant's 
coverage determines the size of the overlap containing consumers which can be 
served by both firms (1998a, p 17). The market share of the incumbent, 
network j , is 











and the share of the entrant, networ~, is 
Substituting in the original market share for full coverage the market shares are 
now given by 
and 
Under uniform tariffs Laffont et al examine two fonns of entry: unbundling and 
facilities based. When the entrant does not build all the necessary infrastructure 
themselves they must lease some from the incumbent. The incumbent charges ~ 
for connecting the entrant to each consumer. The incumbent is faced with 
costs,.!, for connecting each consumer, and C, the joint and common cost of the 
network. The Ramsey price must be adjusted to take account of C. The 
socially optimal interconnection fee is set below marginal cost in order to offset 
the incumbent market power. The socially optimal lease price, ~*, is equal to 












Facilities based entry is of more relevance to in this paper. When the regulator 
mandates interconnection at a set price then the entrant undercuts the incumbent 
and incurs access deficit. The entrant strategically under-invests, which allows 
the incumbent to retain a wider captive market. The incumbent can then keep 
prices high and exploit this portion of the market. The entrant benefits from the 
incumbent's high prices. They can increase their price or market share, and 
hence their profit (l99Sa; pIS). 
When a regulator mandates interconnection but lea\·es the networks free to 
bilaterally negotiate the interconnection fee the incumbent can force the entrant 
to accept asymmetrical interconnection fees (199Sa; p IS). If the entrant enters 
with a low coverage, it will be very difficult to entice consumers before there is 
interconnection as there are few people they can phone. This is a strong 
position for the incumbent as they can threaten to hold out on reaching an 
agreement on interconnection until it suits them. The entrant will be forced to 
accept asymmetrical interconnection fees. If the entrant enters with high 
coverage they are in a stronger bargaining position as there is the potential for 
them to supply most of the market and have a minimum need of 
interconnection. The entrant thus has an incentive to over-invest in coverage. 
Laffont et al (199Sb) found that when networks pnce discriminate the 











prices, even if the access price lS reciprocal (p55). The incumbent sets an 
extremely high interconnection fee, which forces the entrant either to charge 
high prices and not attract consumers, or to make a negative profit on calls. To 
avoid this situation the entrant has to enter with a minimum coverage of 
1/ I 
v(p )--
J1 > 20" o V(pR) 
The greater the level of substitutability between the networks, cr, the greater the 
minimum coverage required. 
f. Context of this Work 
My works fits into the prior research by exploring equilibrium and entry into an 
oligopolistic telecommunications market. I will begin by examining the 
oligopolistic equilibrium without spatial differentiation. I will then examine 
entry of a differentiated network and how this impacts on the equilibrium prices 
and the social welfare. 
My work is useful as most countries no longer have monopolistic 
telecommunication markets; there is a mobile operator and a fixed line service 
provider, at least. While entry of a differentiated firm may appeal to consumers 
by increasing their product choice it may allow networks to benefit from 











the Ramsey socially optimal price. There are two opposing effects on social 
welfare to be examined, the increase in product choice and a price increase. 
3. THE MODEL 
Unlike Laffont et ([/ who analysed entry into a monopoly market, I will 
exam me entry into an existing oligopoly, and investigate whether entry 
supports collusion. Before studying entry determine the oligopoly 
equilibrium. In comparison to the reviewed literature I model the two 
incumbents in the same spatial location, x=o. The entrant network is 
differentiated, hence located at x= 1. have used Laffont et aI's model, 
described in the previolls section, where possible. This should allow easy 
comparison between their and my results. However my model has differences, 
which shall be explained. 
a. The Players 
The Networks - The strategic players in the model include two incumbent firms 
and the entrant. The networks are profit maximisers. The entrant is denoted as 
networke and the oligopolists are as network j for i= 1,2. As a group the 











I do not spatially differentiate the incumbents as I am interested in the effect of 
network differentiation on collusion. The use of Hotelling's spatially 
differentiated networks in the reviewed model intrigued me and may be 
necessary to prevent a Bertrand equilibrium. 
The incumbent networks each have the capacity to serve the entire market. If 
oligopolists each had the capacity to cover only half the market they could split 
the market evenly and each charge the monopoly price. The rival network 
would not have the capacity to serve more customers, thus there would be no 
competition for the subscribers, The entrant network selects its coverage, fI, in 
the range fI=[O, Jj. It faces cost d(fI} of building infrastmcture. 
In this paper the different spatial location of the entrant is due to different 
technology used by the different networks. In particular I am considering the 
differentiation between fixed and mobile service providers, but the model can 
be used to capture any real experienced difference in technology. 
The oligopoly may consist of either fixed-line or mobile service providers. The 
entrant uses the opposite technology to the incumbents. Other than spatial 
positioning I do not draw a distinction between the services. This is where the 
first complication arises, as fixed and mobile services might not face identical 
costs or offer consumers the same variable net surplus. Mobile phones have 











than fixed line phones. They are compliments to the extent that if the price of 
calls on one network drops more people who were not previously connected to 
any network may join the network. This increases the number of people who 
can be phoned by any consumer. Many people may use both mobile and a 
fixed line phones, they are not mutually exclusive services. The differences 
could perhaps be modeled with different elasticities of demand and different 
cost functions. Vertical differentiation, where firms differentiate their products 
through quality may also be appropriate (Tirole, 1988: p296). I will treat the 
two services as substitutes, so the model can be used for mobile and fixed line 
entrance. This also ensures that the model can be applied to other forms of 
service differentiation. 
By including both fixed-line and mobile service providers in the model we have 
clearly have two differentiated products. Cellular telephone providers may 
differ in small ways, such as the services they offer, their price plans, their 
marketing image and the phones which they offer. While Hotelling's linear 
model is applicable here if there were more than two types of service it would 
not be appropriate. One could adapt to a circular "city" spatial model as 
discussed by Tirole (1998; p283). In this model the firms are arranged 
equidistant from each other on the perimeter of a circle. However this is not 
ideal as firms in this model practically compete with their two neighbours only. 











are three finns, two producing goods of high quality and one of low quality. 
The model includes vertical differentiation through quality and horizontal 
differentiation between the two high quality goods. This may be extendable to 
the telecommunications industry; particularly to model a fixed-line monopolist 
and two differentiated mobile providers. 
With spatial differentiation of the entrant and the incumbents the networks are 
not perfect substitutes. However if the average disutility caused by using a 
non-ideal service is small a network may still entice more customers through a 
relatively small price drop, though not an infinitesimal one. There is still the 
possibility of a Bertrand solution, although the equilibrium price will be higher 
than if the goods were perfect substitutes as there is no incentive for dropping 
the price if no more consumers will join the network. 
Conslimers - They are assumed to be utility maXllTIlSerS, but they are not 
strategic actors. There is no consumer action in the form of boycotting 
uncompetitive finns. The utility functions of the consumers are from the model 
by Laffont et al. The consumers' service preference are distributed along 
x= [O,l}. Consumers at each end have a clear preference for either fixed or 
mobile phones. Those whose preference are distributed in the range x=(O,l) 
have a preference for technology that combines fixed and mobile characteristics 











There is number portability, so consumers can easily port to another service 
provider. 7 This ease of movement does not mean that the switching cost is zero 
or even trivial. There are time costs in researching price plans and porting a 
phone number. Consumers may need to pay for a new SIM card. Number 
portability has still done much to reduce the hassle of changing provider. A 
practical concern with number portability is that customers would not know 
which network the call receiver was on. This problem is resolved in South 
Africa by a warning tone which sounds when a ported number is dialed. 
The cost of switching networks can be included in the model without product 
differentiation. This cost, s, could be included in the consumer's cost benefit 
analysis when deciding whether to move networks. Even if network, charges 
the lowest prices, the saving in call costs from porting may not be worth time 
cost and SIM card fee. The effect of switching costs on the oligopoly 
equilibrium is briefly discussed 
Laffont et af (1 998a; p7) assume that the utility of being connected to a 
network, VO, is sufficient for everyone to be connected, even if they do not make 
phone calls. This is somewhat true. The number of cellular phone subscribers 
7 This implies unfortunately that consumers can port between mobile and fixed line providers 
and retain their number. This is fallacious. However if they changed their handset and could 












10 South Africa grew from 11 million to 25 million over the period 2001 to 
2005 (South Africa Foundation, 2005; pI7). There remain 15-25 million South 
Africans without cellular phone subscriptions. However some of the citizens 
have fixed-line phones. In poorer families people may share handsets, and even 
in wealthy households people share fixed-line phones. For simplicity I will use 
their assumption but with different wording, that the citizens who are not 
connected to a network cannot afford the initial cost of the instrument. This 
implies that even if unit call charges decrease new customers will not enter the 
market. Since the entire market is connected before entry, this implies that the 
incumbents can serve the entire market together. 
Consumers cannot be connected to more than one network at a time. This is to 
prevent them from circumventing termination based price discrimination by 
joining all networks and vary the originating network they use according to 
whom they call. This assumption may not be necessary if modeling two-part 
tariffs as consumers would have to pay each network a fixed fee. Even without 
the fixed fee the hassle of alternating SIM cards may outweigh the benefit of 
lower call costs for most consumers. 
The Regulator- It is not a strategic actor, but is represented as boundaries to the 
strategy set. Thus if the regulator has capped prices then this appears as an 











For simplicity I assume that the regulator is interested in ensurIng that the 
licensed networks do not go out of business. Thus it sets a price floor equal to 
the industry budget constraint, the Ramsey price. The networks' call price must 
be equal to of greater than the Ramsey price. This ensures that if networks face 
the industry marginal cost, c, they will break even on each consumer. 
b. Tariff Strategies 
Laffont et (II consider the existence of two part tariffs, which consist of a fixed 
subscription fee and a unit call charge, and their debilitating effect on collusion. 
For simplicity and empirical accuracy I will treat tariffs as a straight charge per 
unit, as is the case with pre-paid cell phonesx. The service providers recoup 
fixed costs from the call revenue. 
The incumbents and the entrant can select whether to use termination-based 
price differentiation or unifonn pricing. The interconnection fee, a, is equal to 
or greater than the marginal cost of interconnection, co. This fee is determined 
exogenously from the model. 
RThis is appropriate given that 80- 85% of cell-phone users in South Africa are on pre-paid. 











c. Game Structure 
Time Frame - The game has is sequential, but contains simultaneous moves. 
Akin to Laffont et al and Annstrong the simultaneous price setting moves in the 
game are not infinitely repeated, as it is a one-shot game. This may be 
appropriate as networks spend money advertising their prices creating large 
menu costs if they change them frequently. In South Africa contract 
subscribers have to contract for two years and prices are fixed for that period. 
Oligopo~v Form - While networks may select coverage, it is difficult for them 
to limit the quantity of calls made by each subscriber. Therefore networks 
optimize through setting prices, not by setting quantities. The finns face equal 
demand and cost functions. Thus a Bertrand price-setting oligopoly is more 
appropriate than a Coumot quantity-setting structure. Since the game is not 
infinitely repeated a Bertrand paradox may occur. The entrant also competes 
on prices, but is not a perfect substitute for the incumbent networks. 
Sequence - The games IS sequential, but contains simultaneous pncmg 
decisions. 











2. The entrant selects coverage, ~l, between 0 (no coverage) and 1 (full 
coverage. 
3. The entrant then sets a policy ofunifonn or discriminatory pricing9• 
4. The incumbents and the entrant then set prices simultaneously and non-
4. UNIFORM PRICING OLIGOPOLY 
In an oligopoly without tennination based price discrimination subscribers are 
charged the same price, pi, for on- and off-net calls by their service provider. 
While consumers are still located evenly over the interval x=[O.l), there is no 
spatial differentiation between the two incumbents: they are both located at 
x=O. Without spatial differentiation the variable utility of the consumers and 
thus the market share of the networks is entirely detennined by the price. The 
disutility from receiving a non-optimal service is equal across the networks. 


















a. Market Shares 
Consumers are indifferent between the two networks if 
Since the two networks are perfect substitutes the market shares are discreet. If 
one network prices lower than the other they capture the entire market; 
If the networks have equal prices they share the market as consumers are 
indifferent between the two networks; 
If consumers are indifferent they will randomize between the two networks. 
Given the law of large numbers the market will tend towards an even split, i.e. 
I 
a ----7 -. It must be noted that when there is no differentiation under unifonn 
I 2 
pricing there is never an access surplus/ deficit. 
There are three possible outcomes of market share divisions 
1. That network l charges the lower price and captures the market 
2. That network2 charges the lower price and captures and market 
3. That the networks charge equal prices, hence sell equal quantities of 
calls to each consumer and the interconnection fees cancel out. 
') This is donc publicly so it can function as a signal. If they invest in then marketing of their 











b. Profit Maximization 
The incumbent networks are strategic profit maximisers. Their profit function 




l{c/;,I,\.)'/IljJ!w Dc/it If 
The first order condition for profit maximization is, as nonnal, that 
aJL, = 0 
a. ' 'P, 
which written in full is 
~a, [(p, -c)q(p,)-f]+aJq(p')+(p, -c)(_l]p,-II-I)]+ ~a, a,(a-cO)[q(Pi)-q(P,)] 
~ ~ 
ila i [ -II-I + --a, (a - co) q(p i) - q(p,)] + a,ai(a - Co)( -l]P, ) = 0 
ilp, 




since the market is fully subscribed. If a consumer leaves network j they are 
assumed to join networkJ• Thus the first order condition of can be simplified to: 
ila 
~{(p, -c)q(p,)- f+(a i -a,)(a-cO)[q(Pi)-q(pJ]} 
D.P, 
+ a, (_l]p,-II-I )[q(p,) + (p, - c) + ai(a - co)] = 0 











~a -1/ f' -1/ -1/ ] ~[(p,-C)(Pi )-. +(aj-a,)(a-cO)(p, -Pi) 
p, 
+ a,( -TJP,-I/-I )[Pi-I/ + Pi - C + ai(a - CO)] = 0 
For a unilateral price increase it equals 
This is negative for all prices greater than the statutory minimum, the Ramsey 
price. 
For a unilateral price decrease it equals 
whIch expands to 
This is also negative at the Ramsey price. 
The first term captures the indirect change in profit from change in the market 
share due to the price change. It will be negative if the networks price 











The second term captures the increase in profit from the increased consumption 
of each consumer. If networks are pricing symmetrically and charging the 
Ramsey price then the effect of a price increase on profit per consumer is equal 
to 
-21/-1 -1/ 0 > -11-1 0 2 -11-1 0 75 -11-1 - O.5'lPi - O.5'lPi + .5c 'lPi -. 5a '7Pi +.- CO'lPi . 
c. Nash Eguilibrium 
The applicable market stmcture is a Bertrand oligopoly. The usual solution in a 
Bertrand setting is that firms charge marginal cost and make no profit, P = me . 
Under uniform pricing the perceived marginal cost of network j is equal to 
e + (1- a , )(a - co). The industry marginal cost is c. If the networks share the 
market evenly and P > /1/e then one firm can gain the entire market by 
charging slightly less than marginal cost, lIIe - E. If they do this they will be 
faced with a lower marginal cost, me = e, and be making a positive profit. 
However since networks set prices simultaneously they will both consider this 
in their pricing policy. If they all follow this policy the perceived marginal cost 
will remain 
However the industry cost is e, and when the networks have equal prices there 











If networks charge the industry marginal cost, c, then 
Jr j = a j [-f] 
'-y----' 
Rcltli/Profil 
sll1ce the access deficit cancels out. This is not sustainable. The lowest 
sustainable price which the networks can charge is the Ramsey price, which 
satisfies the industry budget constraint and the regulator's restrictions 
At all prices above the Ramsey price the industry profit is positive. By 
dropping prices fractionally networks which were sharing the industry profit 
can enjoy the entire profit. Knowing that the rival network is thinking this will 
result in both networks dropping prices for fear of losing their half of the 
industry profit. 
The Ramsey price is a Nash equilibrium. If a network increases its price it will 
lose its consumers. If a network lowers its price it will make a loss on each 
consumer. It is also not allowed by the regulator to charge below the Ramsey 
pnce. There is no incentive for either network to deviate from the Ramsey 












If there are unequal market shares then the perceived marginal cost of a call is 
dif1'erent for different networks. The larger networkJ's market share the lower 
their perceived marginal cost. In a Bertrand oligopoly with asymmetric costs 
the firm with the lower cost can charge a price just under their rival's marginal 
cost and capture the entire market (Tirole, 1988; p211). However finns know 
that the industry marginal cost is c, and if they both charge equal prices then 
there is no access deficit. Thus even with different market shares initially the 
firms still charge the Ramsey price. 
Note that the level of the interconnection fee is irrelevant to equilibrium prices. 
Since market shares are discreet networks are not concerned wIth an access 
deficit. Networks will charge equal prices, and if they undercut their rival they 
will capture the entire market and not pay interconnection fees anyway. Hence 
the interconnection mark-up is not relevant. The interconnection fee affects the 
individual profit made per consumer, but does not affect the competition for 
market share. 
d. Switching Costs 
When switching costs exist a network will not be able to capture its rivals' 
customers by undercutting them by an infinitesimally small amount. The 
difference in the total cost to the customer must be greater than the switching 











the industry marginal cost plus the switching cost and the Ramsey price. The 
higher the switching cost the higher the price of calls. 
With switching costs consumers of network\ are indifferent between the two 
networks when 
Thus the additional utility gained from the rival network's lower price must 
compensate the consumer for switching networks. Note that if the industry is 
ne\v and no consumers are signed LIp then switching costs are not relevant. 
d. Welfare 
For the price vector P = (p R , P R) average consumer wei fare is equal to 
W(P) = V(pR) - T(a(P» 
The disutility from not being connected to the ideal service is larger when there 
is no spatial differentiation 
T(a)=tI2 
So the average consumer welfare equals 
W (P) = v( P R ) - t I 2 
This is lower than the average welfare when firms are spatially differentiated 
and charging the Ramsey price since consumers lose more utility from not 











Consumer disutility from not receiving the optimal service, 
T(a)=t(a" +(l-a)2)/2, 
is minimized when 
dT(aXa = t / 2x (2a - 2(1- a)) = t(2a -1) = O. 
Which occurs when t=O or 0.= 112. Ideally networks locate in the middle of the 
consumers at x= 112. This is a standard result of the Hotelling model. 
Unfortunately the firms have no incentive to locate in the centre of the 
distribution if they have to locate together. Their location will affect neither 
market share nor profit. If possible the regulator should license the incumbents 
to provide telecommunications services using technology in the middle of the 
distribution. 
4. PRICE DISCRIMA TING OLIGOPOLY 
In an oligopoly with termination-based pnce discrimination consumers are 
charged different prices for on- and off-net calls by their service provider. This 
complicates the calculation of market shares as consumers suddenly have an 
interest in joining the network which they expect to have the bigger market 











a. Market Shares 
The net variable surplus which consumers receive from network i is 
With equal disutility from non-optimal service, fa, consumers are indifferent 
between the two networks if 
The disutility from not receiving their optimal service cancels out as the two 
networks offer identical services. 




In a duopoly 
which is the market share that network i would receive if all consumers expected 
all other consumers to belong to networkj . However without spatial 











From this the market shares given different price orderings can be calculated. 
Below are some important orderings used to calculate the Nash equilibrium: 
~ ~" MIl 
P -p. -p -p => .. --=>a --i - / - i - i 1./ - 2 1./ - 2 
P~ =p~.<p' =p'.=>M.=O I I ( I 1./ 
and market shares are indeterminate due to division by zero. They should be 
equal however as consumers are indifferent between the two networks. 
~ ~ , , 1 
p = p . > 1) = 1) . => M = 1 => a = -[ / r [ r / [./ [./ 2 
P~>/j T) =p'=>M =OM=I=>a =Oa =1 I 1: /'1: I I 1 "I I 'I I 
P~ =p~. p' >p'. =>M =0 M =I=>a. =0 a =1 I ,'I I I ., / .." I 
b. Profit Maximization 
The incumbent networks earn profit 
J[i = ai[ai(Pi -C)q(Pi)+aj(Pi -C)q(Pi)- f]+aia,(a-cO)[q(Pi)-q(pJ]· 
, v • , v·~-----· 
Retail Pr()/ir Ta min mi()JJ Re \'t'IlIlL' Deficit 
The first order conditions of profit maximization are given by 
Given that a i (Pi' Pi' Pi' P j ) IS not continuous, it IS not differentiable. 











The first order conditions then expand to 
em ~a ~ ~ ( , 'f'] ~a ~ ~ cr' = ~~' [ai(P i -c)q(Pi)+a; Pi -c)q(p,)-, +a,[ ~_' (p, -c)q(p,)] 
'P, P, Pi 
+api[q(Pi)+(Pi -C)(-'7Pi-"-I)]-a,[~~' (p, -C)q(Pi)] 
UP i 
~a ,,~a " 
+ ~~' [a,(a-co)(q(p;)-q(P i )]- ~~' [a,(a-co)(q(p;)-q(Pi)]=O 
P, P, 
and 
dJ[ ~a [- ~ ( , 'f'] ~a - --,' =-,' a,(p,-c)q(pi)+a; p,-c)q(pi )-, +a,[-,'(Pi-c)q(pJ] 
~ ~ ~ 
-aJ~~' (p, -c)q(J\)]+aia;[q(Pi)+(Pi --c)(-'7jJ,-'I-i)] 
.p, 
~a ,,~a " 
+ ~_' [a/a-co)(q(p)-q(p,)]- ~_' [ai(a-cO)(q(p;)-q(p,)] 
~ ~ 
Note that a change in off-net prices affects the quantity of off-net calls and 
hence the access surplus / deficit directly, unlike on-net call prices which only 
affect it indirectly through changes in market share. 
c. Nash Equilibrium 
The networks compete for market share and profit through prices. The two 











by decreasing their on-net call prices, p. This will increase consumer welfare, 
OJ, but will only increase the on-net call volume per consumer. The quantity of 
off-net calls made by each consumer will remain constant. The on-net call 
price will be set at marginal cost, c, as a network can gain the entire market and 
not increase their access deficit by undercutting the other network. Knowing 
this they will both set on-net prices to c, so Pi = PI' 
The market shares, and hence profit are now dependant on the off-net prices. If 
the on-net prices are both set equal to marginal cost, c, the network can capture 
the entire market by undercutting their rival's off-net price. Unlike on-net 
prices, a change in off-net prices will affect the quantity of off-net calls made 
by each customer. If the rival network does not also change prices there will 
not be an access deficit since the undercutting network will capture the entire 
market. If networks charge equal prices there will be no deficit / surplus. 
Knowing this, networks will both reduce off-net prices to the industry marginal 
cost, c. 
Due to the required mll11mUm Ramsey pnce the Nash equilibrium will at 
~ ~ , , R 
Pi = Pj = Pi = Pj = P and the market will be shared evenly. The regulator 
will not allow finns to decrease their prices to C as they will make a loss and be 











consumers will receIve a greater surplus from the rival network and switch 
networks. 
Average consumer weI fare is identical as under unifonn pncmg. The 
interconnection mark-up IS not relevant for calculating equilibrium. 
Termination based pnce discrimination IS not sustainable under non-
differentiation 
6. ENTRY OF A UNIFORM-PRICING NETWORK 
An entrant decides to enter the market. They position spatIally at x=l. 
assume that due to technology limitations a network has a discrete choice of 
either 0 or 1 when deciding where to locate. 
Figure 5: Spatial Network Distribution with a D(!ferentiated Entrant 
Oligopoly 
















a. Coverage and Market Share 
The entrant must first determine their level of coverage, 11, between not entering 
and full coverage, f.1 E [0,1] incurs a cost of d(/-l) which is increasing and convex 
(1998a; p 16). It is assumed that each incumbent has full coverage. 
The market shares are dependent on the size of the overlap in the market, ii, 
which can be served by both the entrant and the oligopoly finns. The market 
share of the oligopoly is 
a o = 1- f.1(l- a) 
and the share of the entrant, network" is 
a e = Jf (1 - a) , 
where 
1 1 
a = a( Po' P e) = 2 + 2t [ v( Po ) - v( p" )] 
is the market share of the oligopoly in the overlap (1998a; p 17). Note that 
1 1 
I-a = a(po' Pc) = 2 + 2t[v(Pe) - v(Po)]· 
Substituting in the original market share for full coverage the market shares are 











It is important to note that the entrant competes solely with the cheaper 
oligopolist. The market share of the entrant is thus determined by the pricing 
policy of the cheapest oligopolist. The market shares of the oligopolists are 
determined through the reasoning in the above sections. From this reasoning it 
is assumed that the incumbents will price symmetrically and share the oligopoly 
market, i.e. 
The market shares between the entrant and the oligopoly as a whole are affected 
by a change in prices in the following manner: 
da f1 da, f1 
_0 = --[q(p,,)] < 0 and -' = -[q(pJ] > 0 
dp" 21 dp" 21 
da f1 da, f1 
_0 =-[q(pc)]>O and -' =--[q(p,J]<O. 
dp, 2t dPe 21 
The effect on market shares of rival networks is equal and opposite due to the 
limited, fully-subscribed market. The market shares of the individual 
oligopolists are detennined discreetly. 
The market shares are affected by a change in the entrant's coverage, fl, as well. 












da" I I I I 
-=a-I=-+-[v(JJ )-v(p )]-I=-[v(p )-\'(p )]--
dj.1 2 21 " " 21" "2 
da. I I I 1 
-' =l-a=---[v(p )-v(p )]=-+-[v(p )-\'(p)] 
dj.1 2 21 " "2 21 " " 
b, Profit Maximization 
The profit of the entrant includes the cost of building the network, and is 
1[, = aJ(p" - c)q(p,,) - f] + a,.aJa - Co )[q(p,,) - q(p,)] - d(lI) 
~--~v~--- ~---~v~---~ '-v-' 
Rt'{oifPro/ir reI' Illlll driuJ! Rt' \ t!!/I{(' De/jelf 
The first order condition for profit maximization of the entrant is that 
which written in full is: 
~ae [(Pe -C)q(p")-f]+a,,[q(p,,)+(p,, -C)(-l]Pe-I)-I)] 
'P,. 
+ ~a" aJa-co)(q(pJ-q(pJ) 
P" 
+ ~a(} a)a - Co)(q(pJ - q(pJ + a"a" (a - co)( -l]p,,-I)-I) = 0 
'P" 
Substituting the market share derivatives and simplifying gives: 
- ~[q(PJ[(Pe -c)q(pJ-f]+(a" -a,,)(a-co)(q(pJ-q(Pe))] 











Given there optimal price, p*, the optimal coverage of the entrant is given by 
dire = 0 
djJ , 
which written in full is: 
a;;; [CPt' - c)q(Pe) - f] + aa~ a" (a - Co )[(q(p,) - q(p,,)] 
+ a:;, ae(a-co)[(q(p,)-q(p,,)]=O 
Substituting in the derivatives of market share with regard to the entrant's 
coverage and the market shares the first order condition becomes: 
(1- a)[(p" - c )q(pJ - f + (1- jJ + jJa)(a -- c~J[(q( Pr) - q(pJ]] 
+ f.1(a -1)(1- a)(a - co)l(q(Pe) - q(p,,)] = 0 
This simplifies to 
(1- a)[(pt' - c )q(Pe) -- f] 
+ (1- 2f.1 + 4f.1a - a - 2a2 f.1)(a - co)[(q(Pe) - q(pJ] = 0 
The extent of the coverage affects the size of the access deficit. 
The budget constraint of the entrant is 
at'[(Pt'-c~q(pt')-f)+~eaJa-co)[~(pJ-q(Pt'n:2 cJkl . 











The profit of an incumbent, network j , where networkJ is the rival oligopolist, is 
Jrj = aj[(pj - c)q(Pj) - f] + aja)a - Co )[q(pc) - q(p,)] + aja/a - cJ[q(p) - q(pJ] 
~--~v~--~' , v ' 
Re faii Pr otil Ter min at/oil Re n"nllt' [)('/icil 
Note that the third term of each incumbent's profit function will always equal 
zero, as the networks price symmetrically can cancel out the access deficit or 
else one of the oligopolists undercuts the other and captures the entire market 
share of the oligopoly. Thus for simplicity 
Re!u!l Pr()/if Il'l"lllill [If/Oil Re \ ('I/I/l' [)cti( If 
The total oligopoly profit is double that of the incumbents 
v 
Retail Profit (r'l min Olio" Rt: \"{'f'lIe Ddiu! 
The individual incumbent's profit is maximized when 
When expanded this equals 
a;;j [(Pj -C)q(pJ-.n+a;[q(PJ+(pj -C)(-'Pj-'7-
I
)]+ ~ a,,(a-cO)(q(PJ-q(p;)) 
+:: a;(a-co)(q(PJ-q(PJ)+a;a/a-co)('Pj-'7-I ) =0 











I dau I dae =----
2 dpu 2 dpu 
Substituting gives 
c. Nash Equilibrium 
While the incumbents want to compete for market share with each other and the 
entrant they are faced with the dilemma that if they undercut the entrant their 
access deficit with the entrant will rise. They will drop prices to the point that 
benefit of gaining the entirety of the oligopoly profit is equal to the cost of 
increasing their market deficit. 
The incumbents welcome the entrant as it allows them to make a positive profit, 
even though reducing their market share. The greater the coverage of the 
entrant, /1, the greater the increase of the incumbents' access deficits when they 
drop their prices. They will welcome a wide coverage as it aids high prices. 
c. Welfare 











We?) = a" v(p,,) + au v(Pe) - T(a(?)) 
The disutility from not being connected to the ideal service is smaller when 
there is spatial differentiation and is equal to 
T(a) = t / 4 
So the average consumer welfare equals 
We?) = a" v(p,,) + a,Y(pc) - t / 4 
Whether welfare has increased or decreased from the levels under a non-
differentiated oligopoly depends on the size of t and the loss to the variable 
surplus from the price increase. 
7. ENTRY OF A PRICE DISCRIMINATING NETWORK 
a. Coverage and Market Share 
The market share of network, in a price discriminating oligopoly is calculated 
through several steps, firstly the consumer's variable surplus is 
The market share of the entrant is given by 
a = Me and Me = 21 + 2
1
t[v(pJ-V(Po)], 











which is the market share that networke would receive if all consumers expected 
all other consumers to belong to either of the incumbents. Market share can 
thus be expanded to 
Given coverage of ~l the entrant's market share is given by 
The total market share of the incumbent firms is given by 
a = 1 - J1 v(p <! ) - v(p" ) 
" v(Pe) - v(Pe) + v(p,,) - v(p,,) 
It is assumed that the incumbent oligopolists do price symmetrically, and hence 
share the oligopoly market evenly, thus 
a = l[l- J1 v(p,,) - v(pJ ] . 
I 2 v(p,,)-v(Pf)+v(p,,)-v(p,,) 
b. Profit Maximization 
The profit of the entrant is given by 
1[" =~,,[ae(Pe -c)q(Pe)+~aO)(pf -c)q(Pe)-f~ 
Re tail Pr o/it 
+ a"a,Ja - Co )[q(po) - q(Pe)] - d(u) 
\ V ) ~
Tel' min alion Re \'011l1l! Dt'./icit Infru,\frucllil'l:' 













+ aja/a - Co )[q(p i) - q(pj)] + ajaJa - Co )[q(Pe) - q(pj)] 
, v~----------' 
Ta mill afi()11 Re \'t'IllIt-" iJe/icit 
Given that the incumbents either have identical prices or else there exists only 
one incumbent, there is never an access deficit between them. Hence the 
incumbent's simplified profit is 
1[j = aj[aj (p, - C)q(pj) + (1- a j )(p, - C)q(Pj) - f] + apo (a - Co )[q(p,,) - q(pj)] 
·-----~v ) 
Refill/ Pru/if Tel" min (Il!oll Rc n !llle De/leil 
c. Nash Equilibrium 
Without uniform pricing the incumbents can compete more amongst themselves 
for market share by dropping their on-net prices. They can set these to the 
Ramsey price. However if they compete with each other by dropping off-net 
prices below that of the entrant's off-net price they will incur an access deficit. 
From the preceding discussion it has been shown that uniform pricing is more 
effective for inflating prices as networks cannot compete over on-net prices 
without raising their access deficit. If an entrant has a choice it is unlikely that 












Social welfare will be higher than under unifonn pricing as the average prices 
are lower. Prices are higher then before the entrant, but disutility from not 
consuming the preferred service has halved. The exact impact on welfare thus 
depends on the size of the price increase and t. 
8. SOUTH AFRICAN CASE STUDY 
South Africa has four mobile service providers and one fixed line provider. A 
rival fixed line provider, Neotel, should start serving residential consumers in 
early 2007. Currently the South African market is a perfect example of an 
oligopoly of undifferentiated networks interacting with a single differentiated 
network. 






















Lessem (2005) investigates the strategic use of interconnection charges in the 
South African mobile sector. He finds that the incumbents, Vodacom and 
MTN, may have made use of above-cost interconnection fees and tennination 
based price discrimination to limit price competition and entry by Cell-C, the 
third mobile operator (p30). He recommends disallowing the use of 
termination based price discrimination, thus using non-linear unifonn tariffs to 
ensure further competition (p30). Lessem overlooks the fact that, although non-
linear tariffs are available in South Africa, 80-85% of subscribers use pre-paid 
phones and a linear tariff stmcture. With linear tariff stmctures, on which this 
paper focuses, termination-based price discrimination may be preferable. 
In Lessem's analysis he treats mobile and fixed line services as complements 
and hence does not consider the role played by South Africa's fixed line 
monopolist Telkom. He notes that Hodge (2005) finds low incomes South 
Africans to consider mobile and fixed-line as substitutes whereas high-income 
South Africans see them as complements. For consumers spending less than 
$1l.94 a month on communication the saving from lower variable costs of 
fixed line telephones is not sufficient for incurring the monthly line rental. 
In 1999, when Cell C was licensed, Vodacom and MTN raised the 
interconnection fee, resulting in off-net call costs increasing from below 











Telecommunications market in 2001 and they responded to the incumbents' 
tennination based price discrimination through price discriminating themselves. 
The entry strategy of Virgin Mobile in 2006 is interesting in that they only offer 
pre-paid linear tariffs and contrary to the rival networks they do not use 
temlination-based price discrimination. While it is free to port to Virgin 
Mobile users still have to purchase a SIM card for R55, so there is a switching 
cost to consumers. 
Consumers are indifferent between subscribing to the incumbent oligopoly 
(MTN, Vodacom and Cell C), and Virgin Mobile when they offer the same 
utility. 
Virgin Mobile is a profit maximiser, which suggests that there is some benefit 
to them to entering with uniform pricing. Their profit function under unifonn 
pricing, where the incumbent oligopoly, network), consists of MTN, Vodacom 
and Cell C, is given by 
TC'/II =a,m[(PI/II-c?q(PI/I,)-.!1 
Re tail Pr of it 
+ ~I/II (ao - ar/ll )(a - Co )[q{j\) - q(p~/I)] + aIm at «(1 - Co )[q(j\) - q(PI/II )~ 











If they had practiced termination-based pnce discrimination their profit 
function would have been 
1[,/11 = a,/JCp,1I/ -C!q(P,II/) - f) 
Rt:fail Protit 
+ a'II/a" - a,II/ )(a - Co )[q(pJ - q(P,;")] + a,II/at (a - Co )[q(Pt) - q(A/J~ 
A('{"/!.',sSlIJplli, nelli'if 
By entering with unifom1 pricing Virgin Mobile is signaling to the market that 
they will not be fierce competitors. They cannot compete easily with the other 
incumbent mobile providers for market share as they cannot drop on-net prices. 
They would have to drop average prices and incur an access deficit. 
It would be ideal for the networks if they could all soften competition through 
unifonn pricing. Virgin Mobile has introduced a shift in the pricing policy 
which can be followed by Neate!' Uniform pricing policies benefit 
undifferentiated oligopolies immensely as they can no longer drop their on-net 
prices to marginal cost. 
9. CONCLUSION 
In this work I have examined the impact of spatial differentiation a la Hotelling 
on the equilibrium of oligopolies. I reason that, under both unifonn pricing and 











networks to charge the Ramsey price and split the market. There is never an 
access deficit. Non-differentiation does not support price discrimination. 
Entry of a differentiated network, which is not a good substitute to the 
incumbents, restores prices above the Ramsey social optimum. While the 
incumbents are still concerned with incurring an access deficit with each other 
for market share they are reluctant to drop their prices too low as they will incur 
an access deficit with the entrant. The effect on consumer welfare is uncertain; 
it is increased through more product choice, but decreased by the price increase. 
An extension of the work would be a more rigorous examination of entry, of 
which the foundation has been laid. Oligopolists welcome differentiated entry, 
unlike monopolists who may attempt to bankrupt the entrant. 
The model is then applied to the South African oligopoly. A potential 
extension of the work would be to model the entry of Neotel, the newly 
licensed fixed-line provider, into the South African market. To make the model 
more realistic one should allow for wealthy consumers who treat mobile and 
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Understanding and Using Letters of Credit, Part I 
Letters of credit accomplish their purpose by substituting the credit of the bank for that of the 
customer, for the purpose of facilitating trade. There are basically two types: commercial and 
standby. The commercial letter of credit is the primary payment mechanism for a transaction, 
whereas the standby letter of credit is a secondary payment mechanism. 
Commercial Letter of Credit 
Commercial letters of credit have been used for centuries to facilitate payment in international trade. 
Their use will continue to increase as the global economy evolves. 
Letters of credit used in international transactions are governed by the International Chamber of 
Commerce Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits. The general provisions and 
definitions of the International Chamber of Commerce are binding on all parties. Domestic 
collections in the United States are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. 
A commercial letter of credit is a contractual agreement between a bank, known as the issuing bank, 
on behalf of one of its customers, authorizing another bank, known as the advising or confirming 
bank, to make payment to the beneficiary. The issuing bank, on the request of its customer, opens the 
letter of credit. The issuing bank makes a commitment to honor drawings made under the credit. The 
beneficiary is nonnally the provider of goods and/or services. Essentially, the issuing bank replaces 
the bank's customer as the payee. 
Elements ofa Letter of Credit 
• A payment undertaking given by a bank (issuing bank) 
• On behalf of a buyer (applicant) 
• To pay a seller (beneficiary) for a given amount of money 
• On presentation of specified documents representing the supply of goods 
• Within specified time limits 
• Documents must conform to terms and conditions set out in the letter of credit 
• Documents to be presented at a specified place 
Beneficiary 
The beneficiary is entitled to payment as long as he can provide the documentary evidence required 
by the letter of credit. The letter of credit is a distinct and separate transaction from the contract on 
which it is based. All parties deal in documents and not in goods. The issuing bank is not liable for 
performance of the underlying contract between the customer and beneficiary. The issuing bank's 
obligation to the buyer, is to examine all documents to insure that they meet all the terms and 
conditions of the credit. Upon requesting demand for payment the beneficiary warrants that all 
conditions of the agreement have been complied with. If the beneficiary (seller) conforms to the 
letter of credit, the seller must be paid by the bank. 
Issuing Bank 
The issuing bank's liability to pay and to be reimbursed from its customer becomes absolute upon the 
completion of the terms and conditions of the letter of credit. Under the provisions of the Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, the bank is given a reasonable amount of time after 
receipt of the documents to honor the draft. 
The issuing banks' role is to provide a guarantee to the seller that if compliant documents are 
presented, the bank will pay the seller the amount due and to examine the documents, and only pay if 
these documents comply with the terms and conditions set out in the letter of credit. 
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Typically the documents requested will include a commercial invoice, a transport document such as 
a bill oflading or airway bill and an insurance document; but there are many others. Letters of credit 
deal in documents, not goods. 
Advising Bank 
An advising bank, usually a foreign correspondent bank of the issuing bank will advise the 
beneficiary. Generally, the beneficiary would want to use a local bank to insure that the letter of 
credit is valid. In addition, the advising bank would be responsible for sending the documents to the 
issuing bank. The advising bank has no other obligation under the letter of credit. If the issuing bank 
does not pay the beneficiary, the advising bank is not obligated to pay. 
Confirming Bank 
The correspondent bank may confirm the letter of credit for the beneficiary. At the request of the 
issuing bank, the correspondent obligates itself to insure payment under the letter of credit. The 
confirming bank would not confirm the credit until it evaluated the country and bank where the letter 
of credit originates. The confirming bank is usually the advising bank. 
Letter of Credit Characteristics 
Negotiability 
Letters of credit are usually negotiable. The issuing bank is obligated to pay not only the beneficiary, 
but also any bank nominated by the beneficiary. Negotiable instruments are passed freely from one 
party to another almost in the same way as money. To be negotiable, the letter of credit must include 
an unconditional promise to pay, on demand or at a definite time. The nominated bank becomes a 
holder in due course. As a holder in due course, the holder takes the letter of credit for value, in good 
faith, without notice of any claims against it. A holder in due course is treated favorably under the 
UCc. 
The transaction is considered a straight negotiation if the issuing bank's payment obligation extends 
only to the beneficiary of the credit. If a letter of credit is a straight negotiation it is referenced on its 
face by "we engage with you" or "available with ourselves". Under these conditions the promise 
does not pass to a purchaser of the draft as a holder in due course. 
Revocability 
Letters of credit may be either revocable or irrevocable. A revocable letter of credit may be revoked 
or modified for any reason, at any time by the issuing bank without notification. A revocable letter of 
credit cannot be confirmed. If a correspondent bank is engaged in a transaction that involves a 
revocable letter of credit, it serves as the advising bank. 
Once the documents have been presented and meet the terms and conditions in the letter of credit, 
and the draft is honored, the letter of credit cannot be revoked. The revocable letter of credit is not a 
commonly used instrument. It is generally used to provide guidelines for shipment. If a letter of 
credit is revocable it would be referenced on its face. 
The irrevocable letter of credit may not be revoked or amended without the agreement of the issuing 
bank, the confirming bank, and the beneficiary. An irrevocable letter of credit from the issuing bank 
insures the beneficiary that if the required documents are presented and the terms and conditions are 
complied with, payment will be made. If a letter of credit is irrevocable it is referenced on its face. 
Transfer and Assignment 
The beneficiary has the right to transfer or assign the right to draw, under a credit only when the 
credit states that it is transferable or assignable. Credits governed by the Uniform Commercial Code 
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for Documentary Credits (International) the credit may be transferred only once. However, even if 
the credit specifies that it is nontransferable or nonassignable, the beneficiary may transfer their 
rights prior to performance of conditions of the credit. 
Sight and Time Drafts 
All letters of credit require the beneficiary to present a draft and specified documents in order to 
receive payment. A draft is a written order by which the party creating it, orders another party to pay 
money to a third party. A draft is also called a bill of exchange. 
There are two types of drafts: sight and time. A sight draft is payable as soon as it is presented for 
payment. The bank is allowed a reasonable time to review the documents before making payment. 
A time draft is not payable until the lapse of a particular time period stated on the draft. The bank is 
required to accept the draft as soon as the documents comply with credit terms. The issuing bank has 
a reasonable time to examine those documents. The issuing bank is obligated to accept drafts and 
pay them at maturity. 
Standby Letter of Credit 
The standby letter of credit serves a different function than the commercial letter of credit. The 
commercial letter of credit is the primary payment mechanism for a transaction. The standby letter of 
credit serves as a secondary payment mechanism. A bank will issue a standby letter of credit on 
behalf of a customer to provide assurances of his ability to perform under the terms of a contract 
between the beneficiary. The parties involved with the transaction do not expect that the letter of 
credit will ever be drawn upon. 
The standby letter of credit assures the beneficiary of the performance of the customer's obligation. 
The beneficiary is able to draw under the credit by presenting a draft, copies of invoices, with 
evidence that the customer has not performed its obligation. The bank is obligated to make payment 
if the documents presented comply with the terms of the letter of credit. 
Standby letters of credit are issued by banks to stand behind monetary obligations, to insure the 
refund of advance payment, to support performance and bid obligations, and to insure the completion 
of a sales contract. The credit has an expiration date. 
The standby letter of credit is often used to guarantee performance or to strengthen the credit 
worthiness of a customer. In the above example, the letter of credit is issued by the bank and held by 
the supplier. The customer is provided open account terms. If payments are made in accordance with 
the suppliers' terms, the letter of credit would not be drawn on. The seller pursues the customer for 
payment directly. If the customer is unable to pay, the seller presents a draft and copies of invoices to 
the bank for payment. 
The domestic standby letter of credit is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. Under these 
provisions, the bank is given until the close of the third banking day after receipt of the documents to 
honor the draft. 
Procedures for Using the Tool 
The following procedures include a flow of events that follow the decision to use a Commercial 
Letter of Credit. Procedures required to execute a Standby Letter of Credit are less rigorous. The 
standby credit is a domestic transaction. It does not require a correspondent bank (advising or 
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• Buyer and seller agree to conduct business. The seller wants a letter of credit to guarantee 
payment. 
• Buyer applies to his bank for a letter of credit in favor of the seller. 
• Buyer's bank approves the credit risk of the buyer, issues and forwards the credit to its 
correspondent bank (advising or confirming). The correspondent bank is usually located in the 
same geographical location as the seller (beneficiary). 
• Advising bank will authenticate the credit and forward the original credit to the seller 
(beneficiary). 
• Seller (beneficiary) ships the goods, then verifies and develops the documentary requirements 
to support the letter of credit. Documentary requirements may vary greatly depending on the 
perceived risk involved in dealing with a particular company. 
• Seller presents the required documents to the advising or confinning bank to be processed for 
payment. 
• Advising or confirming bank examines the documents for compliance with the terms and 
conditions of the letter of credit. 
• If the documents are correct, the advising or confirming bank will claim the funds by: 
o Debiting the account of the issuing bank. 
o Waiting until the issuing bank remits, after receiving the documents. 
o Reimburse on another bank as required in the credit. 
• Advising or confinning bank will forward the documents to the issuing bank. 
• Issuing bank will examine the documents for compliance. If they are in order, the issuing bank 
will debit the buyer's account. 
• Issuing bank then forwards the documents to the buyer. 
Standard Forms of Documentation 
When making payment for product on behalf of its customer, the issuing bank must verify that all 
documents and drafts confonn precisely to the tenns and conditions of the letter of credit. Although 
the credit can require an array of documents, the most common documents that must accompany the 
draft include: 
Commercial Invoice 
The billing for the goods and services. It includes a description of merchandise, price, FOB origin, 
and name and address of buyer and seller. The buyer and seller infonnation must correspond exactly 
to the description in the letter of credit. Unless the letter of credit specifically states otherwise, a 
generic description of the merchandise is usually acceptable in the other accompanying documents. 
Bill of Lading 
A document evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment and issued by a freight carrier engaged in 
the business of forwarding or transporting goods. The documents evidence control of goods. They 
also serve as a receipt for the merchandise shipped and as evidence of the carrier's obligation to 
transport the goods to their proper destination. 
Warranty of Title 
A warranty given by a seller to a buyer of goods that states that the title being conveyed is good and 
that the transfer is rightful. This is a method of certifying clear title to product transfer. It is generally 
issued to the purchaser and issuing bank expressing an agreement to indemnify and hold both parties 
hannless. 
Letter of Indemnity 
Specifically indemnifies the purchaser against a certain stated circumstance. Indemnification is 
generally used to guaranty that shipping documents will be provided in good order when available. 
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About half of all drawings presented contain discrepancies. A discrepancy is an irregularity in the 
documents that causes them to be in non-compliance to the letter of credit. Requirements set forth in 
the letter of credit cannot be waived or altered by the issuing bank without the express consent ofthe 
customer. The beneficiary should prepare and examine all documents carefully before presentation 
to the paying bank to avoid any delay in receipt of payment. Commonly found discrepancies 
between the letter of credit and supporting documents include: 
• Letter of Credit has expired prior to presentation of draft. 
• Bill of Lading evidences delivery prior to or after the date range stated in the credit. 
• Stale dated documents. 
• Changes included in the invoice not authorized in the credit. 
• Inconsistent description of goods. 
• Insurance document errors. 
• Invoice amount not equal to draft amount. 
• Ports of loading and destination not as specified in the credit. 
• Description of merchandise is not as stated in credit. 
• A document required by the credit is not presented. 
• Documents are inconsistent as to general information such as volume, quality, etc. 
• Names of documents not exact as described in the credit. Beneficiary information must be 
exact. 
• Invoice or statement is not signed as stipulated in the letter of credit. 
When a discrepancy is detected by the negotiating bank, a correction to the document may be 
allowed if it can be done quickly while remaining in the control of the bank. If time is not a factor, 
the exporter should request that the negotiating bank return the documents for corrections. 
If there is not enough time to make corrections, the exporter should request that the negotiating bank 
send the documents to the issuing bank on an approval basis or notify the issuing bank by wire, 
outline the discrepancies, and request authority to pay. Payment cannot be made until all parties have 
agreed to jointly waive the discrepancy. 
Tips for Exporters 
• Communicate with your customers in detail before they apply for letters of credit. 
• Consider whether a confirmed letter of credit is needed. 
• Ask for a copy of the application to be fax to you, so you can check for terms or conditions 
that may cause you problems in compliance. 
• Upon first advice of the letter of credit, check that all its terms and conditions can be complied 
with within the prescribed time limits. 
• Many presentations of documents run into problems with time-limits. You must be aware of at 
least three time constraints - the expiration date of the credit, the latest shipping date and the 
maximum time allowed between dispatch and presentation. 
• If the letter of credit calls for documents supplied by third parties, make reasonable allowance 
for the time this may take to complete. 
• After dispatch of the goods, check all the documents both against the terms of the credit and 
against each other for internal consistency. 
Summary 
The use of the letters of credit as a tool to reduce risk has grown substantially over the past decade. 
Letters of credit accomplish their purpose by substituting the credit of the bank for that of the 
customer, for the purpose of facilitating trade. 
The credit professional should be familiar with two types of letters of credit: commercial and 
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letter of credit is the primary payment mechanism for a transaction. 
The standby letter of credit serves a different function. The standby letter of credit serves as a 
secondary payment mechanism. The bank will issue the credit on behalf of a customer to provide 
assurances of his ability to perform under the terms of a contract. 
Upon receipt of the letter of credit, the credit professional should review all items carefully to insure 
that what is expected of the seller is fully understood and that he can comply with all the terms and 
conditions. When compliance is in question, the buyer should be requested to amend the credit. 
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